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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW AP-
PROACH TO RECANTED TESTIMONY - State v. Britt
INTRODUCTION
The American judicial system is founded on the principle that
everyone is entitled to a day in court and that every American has
a right to at least one fair trial.1 However, some judges and schol-
ars have different opinions regarding one's right to another day in
court based on the assertion that a witness recanted testimony in a
previous trial. The questions and criticisms surrounding the dis-
putes between different rules grow as jurisdictions across the na-
tion align themselves to one standard or another.' The North Car-
olina Supreme Court has appeared to carve a middle road between
the standards which will create a more just and workable solution
for trial judges who face the recanted testimony problem in this
State.'
In recent years, courts have been troubled with how and under
what circumstances recanted testimony can be a ground for a new
trial." Courts have brought forward various views on how to best
deal with the issue. Some courts are content with treating recanted
testimony as a form of newly discovered evidence, while other
courts have considered recanted testimony as a special ground for
a new trial.5 In November of 1987, the North Carolina Supreme
Court faced this issue, and in deciding State v. Britt, the justices
held that recanted testimony will receive special treatment in
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. See State v. Robillard, 146 Vt. 623, 508 A.2d 709 (1986) (supports the
traditional Berry rule); But see State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho App. 149, 730 P.2d
1069 (1986) (supports the newer Larrison rule).
3. State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 714, 360 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1987).
4. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984); State v. Caldwell,
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
5. See supra note 2.
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North Carolina.'
Britt placed North Carolina in a minority position by distin-
guishing recanted testimony as a special ground for a new trial.'
The court adopted a modified version of the three part test set
forth in Larrison v. United States,8 providing North Carolina pris-
oners with a more feasible opportunity for post-conviction relief
than they would have received under pre-Britt standards. In addi-
tion, the court has provided North Carolina trial courts a more
workable test that satisfies the critics of the Larrison and pre-Britt
standard.
This Note will discuss how other jurisdictions have attempted
to deal with recanted testimony and the criticisms directed toward
these methods. This Note will further discuss why the modified
version of the Larrison rule, as adopted by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, is immune from these same criticisms. With Britt,
the court seems to have adopted Larrison's positive principles
without adding fuel to the conflict that decision created.
THE CASE
On May 7, 1984, Jerome Parker Britt was found guilty of first
degree murder in North Hampton County Superior Court.9 The
evidence showed that the defendant believed the victim to be hav-
ing an affair with his estranged wife.10 Four witnesses testified that
Britt entered Lowe's Fish Market in Seaboard, North Carolina
with a shotgun, announced to the victim that he planned to kill
him, and shot him four or five times.'" A subsequent investigation
confirmed the victim was armed. 2
After Britt's conviction, Joe Louis Moody recanted his testi-
mony and filed an affidavit which in substance corroborated the
defendant's assertion that he had acted in self-defense.' 3 The de-
fendant sought a new trial pursuant to N.C.G.S. section 15A-
6. 320 N.C. at 714, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
7. Id. (the Britt court recognized that only four other states have adopted
the Larrison rule).
8. 24 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1928).
9. 320 N.C. at 706, 360 S.E.2d at 660.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 711, 360 S.E.2d at 663 (Britt's assertion was that he had entered
the building unarmed and had returned for the gun after the victim began to
draw his).
[Vol. 11:57
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1415(b)(6) (1983), which permits a party to obtain a new trial if he
shows: first, that the evidence could not have been discovered
through due diligence before the trial; and second, that it is di-
rectly and materially related to the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. 14 After hearing testimony from Moody and the investigating
officer, the trial judge denied Britt's motion.' 5
Britt appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court asserting
that the superior court's evidentiary holding should be over-
turned."6 The North Carolina Supreme Court examined the re-
quirements for a new trial based on recanted testimony 7 and af-
firmed the trial court.
Despite the fact that Britt's request for relief was not granted,
the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision marked a considera-
ble deviation from the usual practice of treating recanted testi-
mony as a form of newly discovered evidence.' 8 After finding fault
with the newly discovered evidence, the court looked toward the
test set forth in Larrison which held that recanted testimony can
be grounds for a new trial if three requirements are met: first, the
court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a ma-
terial witness is false; second, that without it the jury might have
reached a different conclusion; and third, the party seeking the
new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given
and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after
the trial.' 9
The court then created and adopted a modified version of the
Larrison rule to be applied by future North Carolina courts in
evaluating recanted testimony.2"
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(b)(6) (1983) (permits a defendant to make a
motion for appropriate relief more than ten days after the entry of judgment if:
"Evidence is available which was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the
time of the trial which could not with due diligence have been discovered or made
available at that time, and which had a direct and material bearing upon the guilt
or innocence of the defendant." The federal equivalent is FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 33).
15. 320 N.C. at 711, 360 S.E.2d at 663.
16. Id. at 712, 360 S.E.2d at 663.
17. Id.
18. See infra note 48.
19. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88.
20. Britt, 320 N.C. at 715, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
19881
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BACKGROUND
Recanted testimony is testimony that has been withdrawn or
repudiated formally and publicly.21 A witness must admit that his
prior statements, made under oath, were false.22 Yet whether and
under what circumstances the witness's recantation will serve as
grounds for a new trial, is a matter of judicial debate.
Courts have granted few motions for new trials on the basis of
recanted testimony.23 One reason might be that recantations have
not always received the attention that they are now getting from
the judicial system.2 4 Prior Larrison, most judges considered re-
canted testimony to be only a type of newly discovered evidence
and treated incidents of perjury as they would any other ground
for new trial.23
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, American courts have tradi-
tionally turned to the landmark case of Berry v. State.26 Essen-
tially all jurisdictions have employed the Berry standard for re-
viewing newly discovered evidence or have adopted a modified
version of it.27 To obtain a new trial under the Berry rule a defend-
ant must show:
1. that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the
trial;
2. that it was not owing to want of due diligence that it did
not come sooner;
3. that it is so material that it would probably produce a dif-
ferent verdict if the new trial were granted;
4. that it is not cumulative only;
5. that the affidavit of the witness himself should be pro-
duced or its absence accounted for; and
6. a new trial will not be granted if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.28
Case law suggests that there are two barriers to these motions.
21. Pradlik v. State, 131 Conn. 682, -, 41 A.2d 906, 907 (1945).
22. United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 989 (1st Cir. 1971).
23. See generally, Note, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Re-
canting Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 973 (1986).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851).
27. 10 Am. Jur. 2D, New Trial § 166 (1971).
28. Berry, 10 Ga. at 527.
[Vol. 11:57
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The first barrier is the strict scrutiny requirements incorporated
within the six prong Berry test. 9 The defendant cannot overcome
this burden unless the circumstances of the testimony indicate
that it had an obvious influence over the jury's decision. Few mo-
tions for new trial have been granted under the Berry rule. 0
The second barrier is the judicial distaste for perjury. The re-
luctance to grant new trials because a witness has recanted is well
documented.3 1 When a witness repudiates he demonstrates a lack
of trustworthiness and credibility.2 Some jurisdictions go as far as
requiring the perjuring witness's death or conviction before they
will grant a new trial.3 Courts which have not evaluated recanta-
tions under a Berry-type rule have consistently denied the defend-
ant relief.3 4 This inherent judicial skepticism, when coupled with
the court's interest and economy and finality, leads to the conclu-
sion that the chances for a new trial are unlikely regardless of what
rule the trial judge applies.
Larrison is clearly not a modification of the old rule, rather it
is a step in another direction towards more flexibility and leniency.
That court's reasoning was founded upon the belief that perjury is
a subject that demands greater judicial attention than it is usually
afforded. 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Larrison court relied
primarily on a decision it had rendered a year earlier, Martin v.
United States. 6
In Martin, the Fifth Circuit assumed a judicial duty to grant a
29. Id.
30. See Grace v. Butterworth, 586 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1978) (held that a wit-
ness who could corroborate the defendant's alibi would only give cumulative testi-
mony). See also United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1979) (held that where the government refused to tell defendant
that witnesses testifying against him were being granted immunity, such denial
was not material enough to warrant a new trial).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954); Harri-
son v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925) (holding that recantations are
looked upon with "the utmost suspicion").
32. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956).
33. Gilliken v. Springle, 254 N.C. 240, 118 S.E.2d 611 (1961) (The Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that this is the rule in civil actions); Powell v. Com-
monwealth, 133 Va. 741, 112 S.E. 657 (1922); Blake v. Rhode Island Co., 32 R.I.
213, 78 A. 834 (1911);.
34. Grace, 586 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1978); Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
35. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 82.
36. 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1927).
1988]
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new trial on every occasion that a witness admits perjury or mis-
take as long as his testimony was material and not cumulative.3 7
The court felt that the only way to assure that perjured testimony
did not adversely affect the defendant's right to a fair trial was to
allow him a second chance to exonerate himself.3
Larrison is a restatement of the principles set forth in Martin.
The Larrison court, in dicta, created the three-part test which has
led to the current debate. Ironically, neither Martin nor Larrison
granted the defendant a new trial, both holding that the recanta-
tions were not believable. 9
Since its inception, Larrison has received mixed reviews. Pres-
ently the majority of federal circuits employ the Larrison stan-
dard40 while an overwhelming majority of state courts still rely on
the traditional Berry standard.4' A few courts have rejected Lar-
rison outright.42 The Fourth Circuit adopted the Larrison test in
United States v. Wallace in 1976. 43 The Britt court cited Wallace
favorably in an attempt to justify their holding."'
Britt has included North Carolina in the handful of states that
now impose a more lenient standard.46 Although North Carolina
37. Id. at 976.
38. Id.
39. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 89; Martin, 17 F.2d at 976.
40. United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 858 (1979); United States v. Runge, 593 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 859 (1979); United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.
1976); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 991 (1975); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1973); United
States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971);
Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956); Gordon v. United States,
178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950).
41. State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 715, 360 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1987).
42. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984); State v. Robillard,
146 Vt. 623, 508 A.2d 709 (1986).
43. United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976).
44. 320 N.C. at 714, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
45. Those states are Delaware in Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428 (Del.
1982); Idaho in Lawrence, 112 Idaho App. 149, 730 P.2d 1069 (1986); Minnesota
in Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); South Dakota in Pickering v. State,
260 N.W.2d 234 (S.D. 1977). These states apply Larrison. Illinois applies a stan-
dard different from Larrison or Berry. In People v. Bracey, 51 Ill. 2d 514, 283
N.E.2d 685 (1972), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant must show
perjured testimony was used. If he does the burden shifts to the state to prove it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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has adopted a modified version rather than the pure form of the
Larrison rule, its premise is still based on the notion that the bur-
den on defendants who have been convicted through perjured tes-
timony should not be as great as it has traditionally been.
A case-by-case analysis of past North Carolina decisions leaves
some doubt as to what the previous North Carolina position was
with respect to recanted testimony. In State v. E~lers,46 the court
faced a situation where a key state witness had repudiated his tes-
timony. In Ellers the court did not apply a newly discovered evi-
dence standard but instead held that in this situation such a stan-
dard would not be applicable.47 However, in several subsequent
decisions the court applied a North Carolina version of the Berry
newly discovered evidence rule to determine whether the defend-
ant was entitled to a new trial. 8
The North Carolina version of the Berry rule is even more de-
manding than the original. Under the North Carolina rule a de-
fendant is faced with seven perequisites:
1. that a witness or witnesses will give newly discovered
evidence;
2. that such newly discovered evidence is probably true;
3. that it is competent, material, and relevant;
4. that due diligence was used and proper means were em-
ployed to procure the testimony at trial;
5. that the newly discovered evidence is not merely
cumulative;
6. that it does not tend only to contradict a former witness or
to impeach or discredit him;
7. that it is of such a nature as to show that in another trial a
different result will probably be reached and that the right will
prevail. 49
Structurally, the North Carolina version of Berry differs from
the original only through the additional requirement that the evi-
dence being offered probably be true.50 This extra requirement is
significant in that it rests in the trial judge more discretion than
the traditional Berry rule. By vesting the trial judge with more
46. 234 N.C. 42, 65 S.E.2d 503 (1951).
47. Id. at 45, 65 S.E.2d at 505.
48. State v. Blalock, 13 N.C. App. 711, 187 S.E.2d 458 (1972); State v. Mor-
row, 264 N.C. 77, 140 S.E.2d 767 (1965); State v. Roddy, 253 N.C. 574, 117 S.E.2d
401 (1960).
49. State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 230, 243, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980).
50. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 715, 360 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1987).
19881
7
Jones: Criminal Procedure - North Carolina's New Approach to Recanted Te
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
personal discretion, the North Carolina version of the Berry rule
has invaded the jury's domain by making the court the sole judge
of new testimony's credibility in instances where a witness has
recanted.
In State v. Nickerson,51 the last case prior to Britt to deal
with recanted testimony, the North Carolina Supreme Court fore-
shadowed the Britt decision. The court awarded the recantation
issue in its decision but did make a quasi-commitment to the is-
sue's uniqueness.52 The court cited Ellers as precedent and recog-
nized that the rules governing recanted testimony and newly dis-
covered evidence are not the same.53 Thus, Nickerson became an
important step towards rationalizing the Britt court's decision.
Britt is not the first attempt by a state or federal court to
modify Larrison. The Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Ro-
billard54 adopted the Larrison rule but employed a "probability"
rather than a "might" standard for evaluating the effect of the per-
jury on the jury.55 In United States v. Willis," a Pennsylvania dis-
trict court created a version even more liberal than Larrison itself.
That court held that the judge should not only consider the new
testimony's effect on the jury's verdict but should also consider the
impact it has on the recanting witness' credibility. 7
Robillard and Willis demonstrate that it is not a novel idea to
modify the Larrison rule. The Britt court did not break new
ground, however, it did enter uncharted waters. Time will deter-
mine the decision's validity.
ANALYSIS
The Britt court acted on its own initiative by adopting a mod-
ified Larrison rule through a sua sponte holding." In doing so, the
court used Larrison's liberal principles as the basis for a more real-
istic and workable alternative. In its decision, the Britt court elimi-
51. State v. Nickerson, 320 N.C. 603, 359 S.E.2d 760 (1987).
52. Id. at 609, 359 S.E.2d 763 (1987).
53. Id.
54. 146 Vt. 623, 508 A.2d 709 (1986).
55. Id. at _ , 508 A.2d at 713.
56. United States v. Willis, 467 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1978) vacated and
indictment dismissed on request of U.S. Attorney's office, 606 F.2d 391 (3rd Cir.
1979).
57. Id. at 1113.
58. Neither the appellants' nor appellees' brief advocated adoption of the
Larrison rule.
[Vol. 11:57
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nated the Larrison test's third prong that requires the defense be
taken by surprise.59 Furthermore, the court re-structured the first
two prongs of the Larrison test to reach a compromise capable of
satisfying critics of both Larrison and Berry. Under the new Britt
rule, a defendant may obtain a new trial if:
1. The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony
given by a material witness is false, and
2. There is a reasonable possibility that, had the false testi-
mony not been admitted, a different result would have been
reached at trial.60
The court used very little analysis to justify its holding. Other
than drawing a distinction between recanted testimony and newly
discovered evidence, the only indicia given by the court to support
its reasoning was that it saw Larrison as the better rule. 1 The
court did cite numerous precedents that expressed the judicial po-
sitions behind both the Berry and Larrison rules.82 In doing so the
court implied that its decision was based on both rules' usual
criticisms.
The problems presented can be most easily illustrated by
drawing an imaginary scale. On one side of the scale rests recanted
testimony's dubious character. The need for finality,6" judicial
economy," and the possibilities of collusion and coercion' 5 should
be included. Courts, that feel this is the heavier side, apply the
Berry rule in principle.
On the scale's other side sits a defendant's right to a fair trial
and perjury's negative impact. In the words of the Supreme Court
in their holding in Mesarosh v. United States,66 "the Court must
see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having
taken place here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest
possible opportunity. '67 Courts which feel the greater weight lies
59. Britt, 320 N.C. at 715, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 714, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
62. See supra notes 4 and 40 and accompanying cases.
63. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 377
U.S. 909 (1964).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 545 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278 (4th Cir. 1973).
66. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
67. Id. at 14.
1988]
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with this reasoning apply the Larrison standard's principles.
Unfortunately, the judicial system has yet to produce a rule
capable of balancing both sets of interests. The Britt rule may pos-
sibly satisfy that need. However, the rule must first prove that it
can survive the criticisms that have been addressed toward the
original Larrison standard.
A. Criticism of Larrison
The most common complaint by Larrison critics is that it is a
theory that is too liberal. 8 The general feeling is that the "might"
standard employed by that rule would require reversal in virtually
every case. 9 However, courts have declined to apply the ordinary
meaning of the word "might." "Might" has been regarded as "more
than an outside chance ' 70 and "more than a faint possibility" 71 but
"less than a probability. 72 These interpretations illustrate Lar-
rison's viability. Courts that apply the Larrison rule do not auto-
matically grant new trials under all circumstances. 73 Rather, the
rule has afforded most defendants little more success than they
would have received without it.74
Proponents have been quick to point out that few motions by
defendants for a new trial under the Larrison standards have been
successful. 7 A majority of courts that have evaluated recanted tes-
timony under both standards have reached similar decisions by
holding that a typical case fails under either rule.76
Most judges deny motions for new trials on their decision that
68. See generally Note, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the Larrison
Standard for Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evidence:
State v. Caldwell, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1314 (1983) (hereinafter Note, Criminal
Procedure).
69. Id.
70. Kyle, 297 F.2d at 512.
71. Wallace, 528 F.2d at 866 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1976).
72. Kyle, 297 F.2d at 512.
73. Note, Criminal Procedure, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1314 (1983).
74. E.g., Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1979) (new evidence offered tended
only to impeach witness' credibility), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); United
States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1978) (defendant did not use diligence
in discovering evidence), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979).
75. Id.
76. E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977) (court held
neither standard was met); United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(recantation did not warrant new trial under either standard) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977).
[Vol. 11:57
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the recantation is not believable." Thus, most cases are resolved
before the testimony is evaluated for its effect on the jury.7 8 If a
judge is not "reasonably well satisfied" that the first testimony was
false he need not go any further."
Clearly the trial judge is vested with considerable discretion.
He, not the jury, determines which of the recanting witnesses's
statements are believable. Witnesses are not alien to the tempta-
tion to recant. Collusion, corroboration, and fraud upon the court
are important concerns.80 Even the belief that the defendant has
undergone a moral conversion has induced a witness to repudiate.81
The veracity or falsity of recantations are a matter of judicial
opinion. If the trial judge places credibility with the witness's sub-
sequent statement, he must consider the lie's impact on the jury."
It is here that Larrison's "might" language comes into play. The
trial judge must ask himself whether the perjured testimony was
influential enough to convince the jury that the defendant was
guilty." This is a question that is easily answered if the recanting
witness's testimony was obtained through prosecutorial miscon-
duct. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
prosecutorial misconduct, and even prosecutorial negligence, are a
violation of the Constitutional guarantees of due process.8 '
The answer is seldom this clear. However, the trial judge can
solve his dilemma by simply relying on the burdens of persuasion
placed upon the prosecution in a criminal trial. The state must al-
ways prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8 5
In United States v. Krasny 6 and United States v. Stofsky, 7
the Second and Ninth Circuits expressed the usual criticism that
77. See supra note 31.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Radney, 484 F. Supp. 1032 (D.C. Ala. 1980);
United States v. Bujese, 371 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1967) (both courts found subse-
quent recantation to be unbelievable).
79. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87.
80. See supra note 65.
81. Lindsey v. United States, 368 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1966).
82. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88 (if the recantation is believed, the test must be
applied to evaluate the impact of the perjury).
83. Both Berry and Larrison vest discretion for considering motions for new
trial in the trial judge.
84. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
85. W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 2 Ed., § 1.4(a), at 17 (1986).
86. United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (1979).
87. United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (1975).
19881
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Larrison's "might" standard would require reversal in every case. 8
What these courts and other critics have failed to note is that in
the criminal arena the required burden of proof is substantial
enough to provide the trial judge with adequate guidelines of what
would alter the jury's verdict. If the false testimony was of suffi-
cient substance to support the decision that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt then the case warrants a new trial. If
not, then the verdict should stand. Testimony that was merely cor-
roborative, cumulative, or remotely circumstantial may be disre-
garded under the Larrison standard if the remaining evidence was
capable of sustaining the burden of proof.
The degree of certainty required by Larrison, the "might"
standard, should not be bothersome to judges when viewed in this
manner. Case law demonstrates that the fears expressed by the
Larrison critics have not come to pass.8 9 Larrison's principles have
only been given lip service allowing it no opportunity for it to
prove itself the better rule.
B. Comparison of Larrison and Berry
The principles behind Larrison and Berry vary greatly in the-
ory. If literally applied, the Berry rule would allow a new trial in
only the most severe situations while the Larrison rule would make
the possibility of a new trial much more likely. Current case law
tends to suggest that these are more illusory than real since new
trials are seldom granted on recanted testimony grounds regardless
of the standard applied.90 The reason may be that Larrison and
Berry are more similar than either rule's proponents are willing to
admit.
Regardless of whether the trial judge determines that the jury
"might" have reached a different conclusion or that a new jury
would "probably" reach a different conclusion, that decision is
solely his.9 On appeal, the standard of review of the trial judge's
decision not to grant a new trial will be abuse of discretion. There
is little chance of success under either rule since appellate courts
seldom overrule a decision based on abuse of a trial judge's
discretion.2
88. Krasny, 607 F.2d at 843; Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 245.
89. See supra note 74.
90. See supra note 78.
91. See supra note 84.
92. Krasny, 607 F.2d at 840.
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Larrison and Berry further concur by requiring that the new
testimony be material. 3 "If the requirement of materiality is not
demonstrated there is no need to consider whether knowledge of
the falsity by the factfinder 'might' or 'probably' would have re-
sulted in a different verdict." 9 If a witness's testimony was not
material it probably had little effect on the first jury's decision and
would probably have little effect on a jury's decision in a new trial.
A third similarity is Berry's "due diligence" requirement and
Larrison's surprise requirement. Under either standard, the new
testimony that is now being offered must have been unavailable to
the defendant at trial.93 It is not the court's policy to allow the
defendant "a second bite at the apple."9
The distinctions between the standards are more obvious and
dramatic, despite these similarities. Collectively, the differences il-
lustrate the notion that Berry is strict in theory while Larrison is
much more lenient. Past application of both rules has not favored
this reasoning.9 7
Even at first glance, the rigidity of the Berry rule is apparent.
The newly discovered evidence test's six steps are filtering mecha-
nisms that serve as impediments to most new trial motions. In
each instance the defendant is put in the difficult position of hav-
ing to overcome a substantial burden of proof. In addition, there is
the strong judicial disfavor for granting new trials because a wit-
ness has recanted.9 8 These factors leave the defendant with little or
no chance of securing a new trial.
The Larrison standard is an effort to encourage judges to allo-
cate more consideration to recanted testimony. Larrison's effect is
to place recanted testimony in a separate and distinct sphere while
lessening the burden of proof the defendant must meet to obtain a
new trial.9 9 The result is that the Larrison principles differ with
those set forth in Berry in three ways. 100
First, there is a difference regarding the degree of certainty
93. The Larrison standard requires that the recanting witness be a material
witness. Berry requires the new testimony to be material enough to change the
verdict.
94. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, - , 473 A.2d 450, 453 (1984).
95. Id.
96. Lawrence, 112 Idaho App. at __ , 730 P.2d n.2 at 1072.
97. See supra notes 30 and 74 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
99. Martin, 17 F.2d at 976.
100. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88.
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the trial judge must satisfy in order to grant a new trial. °10 Lar-
rison asks the judge to determine whether the false testimony
"might" have influenced the jury in its decision of guilt.102 The
standard of certainty is more encompassing than the "probability"
requirement of Berry. A defendant will obviously have to present
more conclusive and persuasive evidence that his right to a fair
trial was violated in order to get a new trial under the Berry rule.
Since the burden on the defendant in a court applying the Lar-
rison rule is less, the trial judge has less opportunity to exercise
discretion in his decision.
The second contrast revolves around the place in time where
the false testimony must be evaluated. 0 3 The Larrison rule consid-
ers the appropriate time to be in the past. A trial judge must retro-
spectively scrutinize the jury's decision in the original trial and de-
termine whether they might have rendered the same verdict
without the perjury.10 4
Berry, on the other hand, looks toward the possible new trial
and considers what the verdict probably would be without the false
testimony.'0 5 The trial judge must predict how another future jury
would react. He is forced to make presumptions that the previous
trial's tainted portions would not have an equally adverse impact if
a new trial were granted.
Larrison's advantage is apparent. The trial judge is faced only
with considering what has already occurred. 06 He is not forced to
evaluate future probabilities. A new trial should be granted if the
jury "might" have reached a different conclusion without the false
testimony.117
The third distinction between Berry and Larrison relates di-
rectly to this time element.10 8 The Larrison rule takes the perjured
testimony away from the jury and then asks the question of
whether they would have reached the same verdict in its ab-
101. See generally Note, Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard For New
Trials Based Upon Perjured Testimony, 11 GOLDEN GATE 171 (1981). (hereinaf-
ter Note, Ninth Circuit Adopts).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88.
105. Berry, 10 Ga. at 527.
106. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88.
107. Id. at 87.
108. Note, Ninth Circuit Adopts, 11 GOLDEN GATE 171 (1981).
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sence. 1°9 Berry, by looking towards the next trial, would place the
prior testimony as well as the later recantation before the court. 110
The jury would be presented with the opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witness knowing that he has fabricated his state-
ment on one of the two occasions. This certainly must enter into
the trial judge's prediction of what the verdict would be at the
next trial.
Precedent would suggest that Larrison has failed in its ambi-
tion to create a more equitable rule."' This has happened because
the rule in practice differs from the rule in principle. It has been
suggested that false testimony damaging enough to pass the Lar-
rison test would pass under Berry as well." 2 The Britt decision
may have presented North Carolina with the opportunity to reach
a compromise between these two standards and what can be realis-
tically accomplished.
C. The Britt Decision
The Britt court has not only attempted to create a more ac-
ceptable version of Larrison but has more importantly left those
seeking a new trial with an alternative to the harsh test applied to
newly discovered evidence. The Britt rule should eliminate the
Berry hardship that existed in earlier cases.
The most obvious difference between Britt and the Berry
newly discovered evidence rule is the degree of certainty which a
trial judge must have with respect to the false testimony's detri-
mental effect on the jury. On review, the trial judge now must find
only that there was a "reasonable possibility" the jury would have
come to a different conclusion. 1 3 The new standard has the poten-
tial of fulfilling the Berry test's needs and Larrison's expectations.
By imposing a "reasonable possibility" standard, judges are af-
forded sufficient latitude to make judgments based on a realistic
picture of the circumstances. Furthermore, the Britt requirements
should eliminate the traditional complaint that the Berry standard
vests the trial judge with too much discretion.
The Britt court also eliminated the Larrison requirement that
109. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88.
110. Berry, 10 Ga. at 527.
111. See supra note 76.
112. Note, Criminal Procedure, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1314 (1983).
113. Britt, 320 N.C. at 715, 360 S.E.2d at 665.
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the defense be taken by surprise."" In doing so the court did not
qualify its reasons but did reflect the opinion that the surprise re-
quirement should not be necessary in recanted testimony cases. " '
This decision creates a better rule because the effect of perjury is
repulsive to any attempt at a decision based on the facts.
Perjured testimony is unlike any other form of evidence be-
cause it is not only deceptive but highly influential on jurors who
see and hear a witness make false statements under oath." 6 Even
though the defense may be able to prepare and meet the perjury at
trial, it is obviously a difficult obstacle in the path of justice. The
judicial system's goal is to allow the jury to make their decision
based on facts as actually perceived by the witnesses. " 7 This goal
is defeated whenever false evidence is presented at trial. The Britt
court's decision to eliminate the surprise requirement is judicial
recognition of the feeling that perjury is repugnant to any attempt
at a fair and accurate result and should be rectified when
discovered. " 8
CONCLUSION
The Britt holding will allow a convicted defendant a new trial
when a witness recants. The trial judge must be reasonably well
satisfied that the testimony was false and there was a reasonable
possibility that the jury would have reached a different conclusion
without it. North Carolina has adopted a modified version rule ap-
plied by a minority of states but by a majority of federal circuits.
What remains to be seen is whether the courts of North Caro-
lina will apply the new rule with the same sense of fair play that
led to its creation. If they do not, then Britt does nothing more
than camouflage harsh practice with lenient words. If they do, then
criminal defendants who have been convicted on the basis of per-
jured testimony should find that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has taken steps to insure that their right to a fair trial is well
protected in this state.
Walter L. Jones
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Mesarosh, 352 U.S. at 14.
117. Id.
118. Britt, 320 N.C. at 715, 360 S.E.2d. at 665.
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